Why Singaporeans should not trust GIC, manager of CPF retirement funds

Unlike Norway’s national reserves which have been managed with 100% transparency, GIC has selectively disclosed information/data for decades. The fund | Norges Bank Investment Management

Value of Norway’s reserves in real time.
Every single investment is disclosed.

Norway lists its largest investments, bond investments, etc in its annual report.

If a fund that’s more than double the size of GIC could be totally transparent, Singaporeans should be asking what GIC is trying to conceal.

CPF members do not know the actual performance of GIC and should not pretend that we do; because GIC’s annual reports publish mostly irrelevant information.GIC Reports | GIC

The reason why Singaporeans have the impression that GIC is a good long-term investor is due to the repeated publication of profitable investments in the mainstream media, as if there are no losses (unless forced to disclose).

For example, BT reported in 2020 that GIC had hit jackpot in its DoorDash investment; it “had invested US$155.1 million across four late-stage financing rounds” and at the close of the first trading day, the value of GIC’s stake had shot up to US$5.04 bil! GIC’s stake in DoorDash bumped to US$5b after first-day pop in public market

So, when it comes to profitable investments, details – down to the amount of profit – are reported to impress the public.

What about unprofitable investments? According to one website, these are GIC’s US-listed investment:
GIC PRIVATE LTD Top 13F Holdings – WhaleWisdom.com

And there are many losers.

While its No. 1 investment DoorDash has been trumpeted in the mainstream media, nothing has been heard about No. 2 GDS Holdings Ltd whose shares are currently trading at more than 90% below its high.

And GDS has been losing more money every year. It is possible that unrealised losses could be at least $1 bil.
What about No. 6 Affirm Holdings which continues to incur more losses into 6th year?

Has No. 7 Yum China turned out to be a good investment?

Will No. 9 Cognex’s fortunes start to improve any time soon?

Currently at No. 10, Uxin Limited used to be GIC’s No.1 US- listed investment; valued at more than US$4 bil. Uxin has never been profitable and would have been delisted if not for the 2 recent reverse stock splits which propped up the share price by 100 times, ie price would otherwise be 1.9 cents without the reverse stock splits.
(See FB post on 25 Feb 2023 @ (20+) Facebook)

Another loser is GIC’s No. 12 real estate firm Safehold Inc which is currently trading at a fraction from its high and near the 15-year low.
Like other cash burners, GIC’s Amplitude Inc is another investment that may go belly up soon.

Other embarrassing investments which Singaporeans will never know are Pagaya Technologies Ltd, Revance Therapeutics Inc, Anterix Inc, CI&T Inc, Movella Holdings Inc, etc.

GIC had more than 19 listed investments and a number of losers had been divested, eg Burning Rock (image below).
Unlike Norway’s SWF, GIC’s preference for opacity is obvious: scrutiny will raise questions about its performance, leading to suspicion and distrust.

If GIC’s listed investments could perform so badly, are its unlisted investments performing much better? It is unlikely.

The scary part is global stock market indices are near recent record highs and a huge correction/collapse is not a question of if, but when. And when that happens, the value of GIC’s portfolio will be decimated with losses exceeding US$100 bil.

The bulk of GIC’s funds come from CPF members. The reason why GIC has not been able to be transparent: there are too many embarrassing investments. Transparency will also shatter the illusion of a fund manager par excellence; its declared and unverifiable returns may also prove to be a lie.

Temasek has no exit plans for investments with multi-billion dollar unrealised losses, government not concerned?

Temasek is sitting on a number of investments with billion/multi-billion dollar unrealised losses; they appear to have gone under the radar.

Standard Chartered plc
In 2006, it was reported that Temasek had acquired 152.4 mil Standard Chartered shares for £2.3 bil (S$6.9 bil). Temasek said it was “optimistic about Standard Chartered’s growth prospects and expects the bank’s shares to carry on rising“. Instead of rising, StandChart shares have been falling for 18 years after raising capital 3 times.
Temasek takes £2.3bn stake in StanChart (ft.com) The exchange rate in 2006 was about £1 = $3/more than £15 per share.

Today, StandChart shares are not only trading at less than 50% of its initial purchase price;

the exchange rate has fallen by more than 40%.
Even after taking dividends into account, capital loss is still more than 30%. Including forex losses of 40%, the initial S$6.9 bil investment has lost more than S$4 bil. Standard Chartered launches rights issue | Standard Chartered | The Guardian

Temasek’s original S$6.9 bil investment has since increased to more than S$10 bil and it is currently StandChart’s largest shareholder.
Standard Chartered PLC: Shareholders Board Members Managers and Company Profile | GB0004082847 | MarketScreener

Bayer
In April 2018, Temasek invested S$4.8 bil in German pharmaceutical giant Bayer. Fast forward 6 years, the investment has lost about 72%/S$3.3 bil in capital value (including dividends).

Olam
Despite allegations of accounting fraud in 2012, the Temasek-led group went ahead and made an offer to take Olam private 2 years later at S$2.23/share. Excluding dividends, its share price has fallen about 50% in 10 years. Temasek’s unrealised loss is at least S$1 bil.

There are other investments with substantial losses.

While there’s no denying a few investments are sitting on huge unrealised gains, eg Blackrock, these gains pale in comparison with losses. Temasek could clarify with supporting verifiable data.

Evident from Temasek’s listed investments, based on publicly-available information, its performance is mediocre at best. It’s likely that the performance of its unlisted investments – 52% of portfolio – will be any different.

Without transparency, isn’t it silly to accept Temasek’s self-declared performance at face value?

PS
If Norway’s SWF can disclose its more than 8000 investments – listed investments in real time – with full transparency, what is Temasek trying to conceal from Singaporeans?
The fund | Norges Bank Investment Management (nbim.no)

Temasek’s high investment returns resulted from transfer of state assets at nominal prices, Singaporeans have been fooled

Temasek has not only taken Singaporeans for a ride but the whole world as well. Its investment returns cannot be verified, and should be taken with a pinch of salt. This is common sense.

Its ‘savvy investor’ image is just an illusion created by state-controlled mainstream media which publishes only highly profitable investments while ignoring those that have incurred massive realised/unrealised losses.

Fact: A handful of non-listed companies have generated huge returns for Temasek. For example, SP Group – 100% owned by Temasek – has earned average annual profits of about $1 bil in the last 19 years. (Image below from a blog post, SP profits from 2005 to 2017)

SP Group average annual net profit almost $1 billion for past 13 years
$1 billion profit, so electricity tariffs raised 22% – geraldgiam.sg

PSA, another 100% owned unlisted company, made annual net profit of about S$1.5 bil in the last 2 years. Over a period of more than 2 decades, PSA is likely to have contributed at least $20 bil to Temasek’s coffers.

240322-PSA-Group-Financial-Results-FY2023.pdf (singaporepsa.com)

Other profitable unlisted companies include Surbana Jurong, Mapletree Investments, etc. These companies have benefited from government transfer of national assets at nominal prices or the use of public resources. Without this, Temasek’s high returns would not have been possible.

Another example: POSB – a former statutory board – was sold to DBS for a paltry sum of S$1.6 bil. PAP’s transfer of state assets at lelong prices DBS would not be where it is today without profits generated by POSB, needed for expansion.
What about CAAS? From State to Temasek – Leong Sze Hian

Besides unlisted assets, listed domestic companies like DBS, Singtel, Keppel Corp, etc have also made tons of profits as well as earned tens of billions in dividends for Temasek.

Temasek is also no ordinary commercial company competing fairly with other companies; legislations could be tweaked to enhance the growth of TLCs. For example, public transportation fare hikes were approved to increase profits of SMRT and SBS Transit.

Shortly before delisting from SGX, coincidentally or otherwise, the government introduced a new rail financing framework and paid S$1 bil for ‘SMRT’s operating assets’ to help it reduce operating costs. SMRT was effectively guaranteed a profit to provide public transportation service. LTA to buy SMRT assets for S$1 billion under new financing framework

Point to note is SMRT already owned prime properties – for rental and advertisement – which are also profit-guaranteed.

Temasek’s biggest profit came from the sale of 3 power generation plants; completion of the sale in December 2008 added S$12 bil to its coffers. How much did Temasek pay the government for them is of course another state secret.

In conclusion, Temasek’s self-declared high investment returns is achieved by the government’s transfer of state assets at nominal prices and tweaking legislations. Temasek could clarify this with proper disclosure of material information, unless it has something to hide.

PS
Since Ho Ching, spouse of PM Lee, joined Temasek in 2002 and became CEO in 2004, Temasek and our MSM have attempted to put her in the league of investment greats like Warren Buffet. This is not only laughable but also insulting to real investment gurus.

For example, Temasek had selectively measured Ho’s performance from near 2003 market bottom in its FY 2013 Temasek Review, suggesting to readers that Ho was instrumental in helping to achieve a 20% 10-year Annualised (SGD) returns on ‘newer investments made after 31 March 2003’. TR13_MediaConferenceSlidesFrom 2014 till Ho stepped down in 2021, there was no subsequent disclosure of 10-year returns of newer investments made after Ho became CEO. Why?

Temasek’s performance is really nothing to shout about, imho. From publicly-available information, most of its profits/dividends came from …domestic companies.

HDB ‘ownership’ scam: HDB flats affordable because land cost was excluded in the past, ‘lessee’ vs ‘owner’ wasn’t an issue

No one can possibly own a HDB flat after signing a lease agreement.

Whether one was called a HDB flat ‘owner’ – without ownership rights after signing a lease agreement – did not matter decades ago due to the fact that most lessees did pay land cost.

Not only was land cost excluded, most HDB flats were sold below construction cost. (image below from FB post)

Without the land cost component, HDB flats were truly affordable and could be purchased on a single income.*

Today, the land cost component is about 60% of the total price of a HDB flat. ** Even though strata titles are not transferred, HDB lessees have been repeatedly told we are “owners” by politicians and the mainstream media.

In response to Ku Swee Yong’s commentary “that we be honest with ourselves and recognise that we are merely lessees who rent the HDB flats for their terms”, PM Lee insisted that “HDB lessees have all the rights over their flats that owners of such leasehold private properties have. You can live in it, you can transact it, you can bequeath it to your children – it is yours”. PM Lee Hsien Loong refutes notion that 99-year HDB lease is extended rental, not a sale | The Straits Times (26 Aug 2018)

It appears that Singaporeans are easily fooled. Going by PM Lee’s logic: HDB lessees = owners, owners of leasehold private properties = lessees? Since when did a lease transaction result in a lessee becoming the owner? Do car leasing companies consider their lessees car owners?

PM Lee: “In fact, HDB owners enjoy extra privileges, because their flats get upgraded from time to time with generous government funding”.

Fact: HDB flats DO NOT belong to lessees. The “generous government funding” upgraded flats which have always been owned by HDB.

PM Lee: “It is also why HDB prefers to sell very heavily-subsidised flats to low-income households rather than offer them a subsidised rental unit at cheap rents”.

Fact: Without the inclusion of land cost, lessees would not require flats to be “very heavily-subsidised”. The CPF housing grant (subsidy) given is only a fraction of the land cost component which should not have been added to the price of HDB flats. Lessees are therefore subsidising the HDB; not the other way around.

Unfortunately, PM Lee was unable to convince Singaporeans that signing off as lessees on a HDB legal document – lease, not sale and purchase agreement – makes us owners.

If “HDB lessees have all the rights over their flats that owners of such leasehold private properties have”, as PM Lee claimed, can lessees band together and attempt a collective sale? Can lessees fence up blocks of HDB flats and put them up collectively for sale?

In an attempt to hammer the message in, then-MND Minister Wong was roped in to repeat what PM Lee had said a week earlier. ‘Factually and legally wrong’ to suggest HDB buyers do not own their flats: Lawrence Wong – TODAY (todayonline.com)

How is it “legally wrong” when HDB’s own legal document stated buyers of flats are  “lessees”? Did Lawrence Wong lie through his nose, hoping that Singaporeans would not dare continue to question the government on this issue?

Minister Wong had even claimed that HDB lessees “enjoy ownership rights over their properties during the period of lease”. This cannot be further from the truth because if lessees are indeed owners, why are rules with regard to rental/purchase/sale of flats laid down by the HDB? Why must HDB “owners” seek approval from HDB on renting out rooms/whole unit or subject our “owned” property to a pre-sale HDB inspection? If HDB flats are similar to other 99-year leasehold properties, then why is ethnic quota only applicable to HDB estates?

Errr …what ‘ownership rights’ was Lawrence Wong referring to?

Singaporeans have been fooled for decades into paying property tax on HDB flats we don’t own, paying for the maintenance of public areas such as void decks, car parks, playgrounds, etc, make sinking fund contributions for assets belonging to the HDB, etc.

The world has also been fooled: Singapore does not have a very high home ownership rate but one of the world’s lowest because all HDB flat ‘owners’ are in fact ‘lessees’.

In fact, even a $1 mil HDB flat – fully paid in cash – cannot be pledged as collateral to any bank.

Until Singaporeans dare confront the government on this issue, it will not come clean. The removal of land cost – lessees should not be paying – will certainly go a long way to making public housing affordable again.

Without the right to do as we wish with our HDB flats, are we really ‘owners’?

PS

* How affordable were HDB flats decades ago without the inclusion of land cost? In the mid 1980s, I bought a 5-room flat in Simei jointly with my mother. It cost less than $80,000 and monthly instalments were paid from my single income as a RSAF NCO (first contract).

** Cost breakdown for a $400,000 BTO flat today: $240,000 land cost, $160,000 construction cost. A huge housing grant gives the illusion of a real subsidy when in fact this is used to partially offset land cost which HDB lessees should not have been charged in the first place.

Myth of HDB flat ‘ownership’ debunked

There has been considerable interest on the issue of whether ‘buyers’ of HDB flats are ‘owners’ or ‘lessees’. I will compile most of the points I have highlighted in this post and readers can come to their own conclusions.

Below are numerous images from my FB posts which are self explanatory.

1. HDB’s own timeline states clearly that prior to key collection, ‘flat buyers’ are required to sign the “Agreement for Lease”. Without signing a Sale and Purchase Agreement, ownership rights are not transferred and buyers are therefore merely leasing the flat from HDB. That buyers have been permitted to transfer the remaining lease does not make one an owner of a HDB flat.

HDB | Sign Agreement for Lease

2. There shouldn’t be any ‘owner’ vs ‘lessee’ issue because it is clearly stated on the Agreement for Lease, a legal document that HDB is the lessor and ‘owners’ are lessees.
“Agreement for Lease” means just that; we are merely HDB tenants. That buyers have been allowed to pay up the 99-year lease in full – upfront – with a HDB/bank loan (similar to other property purchases), instead of paying rent monthly, does not make one an owner. It’s an arrangement facilitated by the government to create the illusion of ownership.

3. Further confirmation of our lessee status below.

Other FB images below.

No one can possibly own a HDB flat by signing a lease agreement – no different from a tenancy agreement, except for payment terms* – with HDB. Control of the flat ‘owner’s’ property remains in HDB’s hands. **

(A reader’s comments on my blog: “HDB has recently sneakily removed the term “LESSEE” from the Agreement For Lease and replaced it with “PURCHASER”. It has also dropped the term “Lessor” from this document.” Microsoft Word – Generic AFL(new format) 31 May 2017 – specimen.doc (hdb.gov.sg. This is another attempt by HDB to erase its lessor status.)

4. HDB is aware of this issue, since at least a decade ago. In 2014, I queried HDB and the reply from its legal counsel was that the government has defined the purchaser of a HDB lease as an owner under the Housing and Development Act; and so we must be one.

HDB’s response came after an earlier reply from HDB telling me this: “If you own an HDB flat, then you are the owners of the flat”. (Try not to laugh)

5. HDB’s website had all the while been using “subtenants”, “subletting”, etc with regard to lessees – us – renting out flats/rooms. However, HDB had to subsequently amend “subtenants” to “tenants” or “subletting” to “renting out” as more Singaporeans became aware of our true legal status. Below are images posted on my FB.

Original page on HDB website:

Post amendment:

Another HDB document confirming our ‘lessee’ status and HDB the only legal owner of all HDB flats.

If one is an owner, why the need to seek approval to rent out property?

6. Further confirmation of our lessee status:

a. Pasir Ris-Punggol Town Council

b. CNA

c. Real estate professionals*** and financial counselor

The right to transact the remaining HDB lease should not be confused with an actual property transaction, where strata titles are transferred.

The legal document is a lease agreement which states clearly the contract between a lessor (HDB) and lessees (joint tenants). For those who still do not know the definition of lessor: “a person or organization that allows another person or organization to use something they own in return for regular payments” LESSOR | English meaning – Cambridge Dictionary

7. Ministers have attempted to perpetuate the myth of HDB flat ownership by highlighting the similarity between the 99-year leases of HDB and some private property while leaving out these differences:

With regard to en bloc sale, HDB lessees – rightly – have no say; because we don’t own our flats; every en-bloc decision is made by HDB. There is no room for negotiation with regard to compensation.

Unlike real owners of property who will receive a en-bloc sale windfall, HDB lessees are given the option of becoming a HDB lessee of a newer flat!

8. Even a fully-paid $1 mil HDB flat is worthless to a bank; the HDB ‘owner’ cannot even pledge as collateral for a $1 loan. The reason: legal title has not been transferred to HDB ‘owners’.

9. In a 2001 parliamentary speech, then DPM Lee Hsien Loong used the correct term “lessees” with regard to resale application. Are “lessees” and “owners” interchangeable after Lee Hsien Loong became PM?

The fact that one has to apply to HDB to sell one’s ‘own’ flat should be telling; HDB is the owner.

10. The difference between buyers of HDB flats and ECs: the former sign a lease agreement whereas EC buyers sign a S&P agreement. HDB ‘flat buyers’ remain lessees whereas EC buyers own their apartments.

Questions:
Can anyone who signs a lease agreement become an owner?
Can an owner be evicted from his/her own property?

* In the case of a new HDB flat, buyers of the 99-year lease are allowed to borrow the full amount and pay back HDB/banks in monthly installments over 25 years. However, this does not make the lease buyer – right of use only, subject to HDB (owner) terms – an owner of the physical property.

** As the owner/landlord of all public housing flats, HDB lays down all the terms in the lease agreement. For example, ‘owners’ who wish to rent out rooms/entire flats are subject to a set of HDB rules. This is no different from the terms of a tenancy agreement between private property owners and tenants (HDB and HDB tenants, aka ‘owners’).
As HDB tenants/lessees – not owners, our flats are subject to a pre-sale inspection by HDB officers to ensure that flats are reinstated to their original condition. There are other onerous terms when it comes to the purchase/sale of the remaining lease (not physical flat), such as ethnic quota limits, buying eligibility, seeking approval for renting out rooms/entire flat, etc HDB | Residential
HDB can also compulsorily acquire its OWN flats should there be serious breaches of HDB rules.
How can our assets be compulsorily acquired by the seller?

*** “There is a fundamental difference between public housing and private, and that is in the ownership title. Nicholas Mak, SLP International executive director and head of research and consultancy, says: “In public housing, the relationship between HDB and the dweller is as lessor-lessee. It’s not like a private condominium, where upon completion — Temporary Occupation Permit and Certificate of Statutory Completion — the developer will transfer the strata titles over to the individual buyers. For public housing, the property title remains with HDB, says Mak. A group of HDB dwellers in three housing blocks discovered that the hard way when they banded together to attempt a collective sale on their own during the collective sale fever some 20 years ago. “That was when they woke up to the reality that they didn’t actually own the land,” he recounts. “As HDB dwellers, they own just the right to use that box in the sky.” Perils of owning ageing leasehold properties – Singapore Property News (edgeprop.sg)

That HDB owners are in fact lessees was also highlighted by Ku Swee Yong in a 2018 media article, “Outdated ideas on home ownership and land shortage are crippling us; Aug 14”. HDB’s subsequent response – as well as PM Lee’s – failed to convince many Singaporeans that HDB ‘owners’ are not lessees. HDB | Leaseholds confer ownership rights for finite term: HDB
PM Lee Hsien Loong refutes notion that 99-year HDB lease is extended rental, not a sale | The Straits Times

Temasek-linked companies’ long-term performance a joke? Temasek’s published returns should be scrutinised

Temasek’s actual performance may not be as great as propaganda would have us believe; it’s about time Singaporeans scrutinise Temasek’s investments.

A picture is worth a thousand words, so let’s look at the long-term charts of some of Temasek’s major investments.

1. SIA

SIA is currently performing well because other airlines were not bailed out by their governments. Pre Covid-19, SIA was clearly an underperformer, judging from its stagnant revenue in the preceding 5 years, ie 2015 to 2019. Record payout for SIA CEO Goh a slap in the face for shareholders
SIA had invested in Indian airlines Vistara, which had been making losses since day one. Vistara was then forced to merge with loss-making airlines, Air India, which eventually resulted in SIA owning 25% of Air India. Singapore Airlines to acquire 25.1% stake in Air India under deal with Tata
Despite revenue doubling in FY2023, Air India’s profit decreased by 18%.

Billion-dollar question: Will the merger of 2 loss-making airlines result in profitability?

From GLCs’ past record of overpaying for foreign investments and poor judgement, Air India may likely turn out to be a noose around SIA’s neck.

2. Seatrium

In April, Seatrium (formerly Sembmarine) disclosed it had recorded losses for 3 consecutive years, raising concerns about its financial health. Seatrium’s current share price speaks volumes of how badly the company has been managed. While Seatrium’s order book continues to swell, whether its contract wins turn losses to profits remains to be seen.
Point to note is Seatrium was formed through the merger of Sembmarine and Keppel O&M.  Both companies took extremely high risks to become the world’s top 2 largest builders of oil rigs and had incurred MASSIVE losses in a number of years prior to their merger.
How the merger of 2 companies which had lost billion$ will ever make them profitable has left many investors scratching their heads. Isn’t it better to abandon ship?

3. Keppel Corporation

Kepcorp (O & M) and Sembcorp Ind (SembMarine) took gargantuan risks to become the 2 biggest rig builders in the world, on the assumption that oil prices would remain elevated. The bet cost billions. Loss-making SembMarine was then conveniently demerged from Sembcorp and merged with loss-making Keppel O&M in the expectation that 2 loss making companies could miraculously turn a profit. (Similar to Vistara and Air India?) Temasek (taxpayers) owns 38% of the new entity Seatrium (formerly SembMarine).

If Temasek had not facilitated the merger/demerger, Kepcorp shares would likely be trading below $5, with Sembcorp possibly achieving penny stock status.

4. Sembcorp Industries

Without a meaningful change in management, it is likely for history to repeat itself.

5. Singapore Telecommunications

The chart speaks for itself. Singtel’s shareholders appear to have misplaced trust in its management. How could senior management have got it so wrong?

6. Olam Group

9 years after Temasek’s privatisation offer, Olam share prices are currently trading 50% below the offer price. Temasek offered $2.23 per Olam shares in 2014, sitting on bilion-dollar loss Hmm … another penny stock in the making or potential candidate for delisting?

7. Singapore Post

The chart above speaks for itself.
Less than a decade ago, SingPost had invested in US e-commerce Jagged Peak and Trade Global which became bankrupt … within a few years. SingPost says bankrupt US units sold assets | The Straits Times
Imho, the government appears to have come to SingPost’s rescue recently by allowing SingPost to hike local postage rate by a whopping 65%. Singapore Post Plans 65% Stamp Price Hike to Counter Mail Volume Drop – Bloomberg
A drop in mail volume would have been accompanied by lower costs but it appears to be insufficient for SingPost stay in the black?

8. Keppel Infrastructure Trust

Similar to SingPost, KIT shares recently traded below the low seen during the global financial crisis in 2009. The chart speaks for itself.

9. SATS

SATS shares are currently trading at prices seen more than 15 years ago. Similar to SingTel and other GLCs, SATS has been expanding by throwing billions at foreign acquisitions; as if political and forex risks are non existent. GLCs should note that unlike operating in Singapore where legislations could be easily tweaked to their advantage or by arbitrarily increasing fares/fees/rental, etc, they are not protected by our government overseas, ie returns cannot be guaranteed.

10. CapitaLand China Trust

Wealth destruction is of course not limited to the above GLCs.

Point to note is global stock markets have yet to correct and when that happens ….

Some of the above companies are supposed to be the bluest of our blue chip companies. As is evident, their long-term performance leaves much to be desired, which begs the question: Are Temasek’s published returns for real?

There are of course many profitable investments but what is Temasek’s actual returns net of  losses?

Killer-vaccine maker Pfizer has proven to be a one-trick pony

The demand for Covid vaccine has fallen off a cliff; so has Pfizer share prices, currently trading at decade-ago prices. Pfizer’s Covid-19 mRNA vaccine is an experimental vaccine which has caused untold suffering for family members of victims who were seriously injured or died.

Pfizer has recently been sued by Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton for “misrepresenting the efficacy of its widely-used COVID-19 vaccine”.

“Pfizer intentionally misrepresented the efficacy of its COVID-19 vaccine and censored persons who threatened to disseminate the truth in order to facilitate fast adoption of the product and expand its commercial opportunity … many of whom were coerced by tyrannical vaccine mandates to take a defective product sold by lies.”

https://finance.yahoo.com/…/pfizer-sued-texas-over…

Bayer investment: Temasek sitting on more than S$3 bil in losses

Share prices of Bayer collapsed within a few months after Temasek had invested S$4.8 bil of our reserves.

Does Temasek have any exit plan for Bayer besides sitting on multi-billion dollar loss or hoping for a miracle?

Special parking privilege for some at drop off area, Elias CC should cease practice

From: Phillip Ang <phillipang63>
Date: Wed, Nov 8, 2023 at 5:51 PM
Subject: Special parking privilege for some at drop off area, Elias CC should cease practice
To: PM LEE <LEE_HSIEN_LOONG>
Cc: <edwin_tong>, <low_yen_ling>, MCCY PERM SEC <tan_gee_keow>, <jimmy_toh>, CNA <digitalnews>, STNEWS <stnewsdesk>, WanBao – <wanbao>, HENG <ken_dxb>, STANLEY <Stanley93896999>, RAYSON <rayson.goh>, JAYA KUMAR <jayakumar89>, LAU <cklau60>, SUKHDEV <ssgill225>, SDP <sdp>, WP <organising>, <ravi>, <contact>

Mr Lee Hsien Loong
Chairman, People’s Association

Dear PM Lee

I refer to my feedback dated 6 April 2013 and 14 Sep 2013 – a decade ago – to Minister Lawrence Wong and PM Lee respectively on the issue of special parking privileges at Elias Community Club.

Images from 2013 feedback (note empty parking slots in carpark)

2013 feedback

2013 feedback1

Since my feedback a decade ago, Elias CC has continued to accord this special privilege to some visitors, one who may be a ‘big shot’.

November 2023

img20231104112451a

img20231104112539a

Should persons with mobility issues or delivery drivers be deprived of using the drop off area because it is being obstructed by other vehicles for hours?

Since ‘big shot’ also has a driver/bodyguard, why can’t his car be parked in the open air carpark with many empty slots or at the nearby HDB carpark?

Must Elias CC be reminded that the CC is funded by taxpayers and that it should not allow any part of its premises to be treated as if it belongs to ‘anybody’s grandfather’? Or is there a set of rules for elites and one for heartlanders?

Thank you and have a nice day.

Regards

Phillip Ang

Flawed CPF rate formula, CPF members scammed of billion$ by the government

The CPF Board’s formula for computing CPF rate has been flawed; for decades. Millions of CPF members have been forced to loan our retirement savings – to GIC for risky overseas investment – at ridiculously-low rates. CPF OA rate has remained at about 2.5% for the past 30 years.

Since inflation started shooting through the roof last year, interest rates have shot up. But CPF rates have remained unchanged except for the MA rate which was only recently increased by … 0.01%. CPFB | CPF interest rates from 1 July 2023 to 30 September 2023

Although the government currently pays about 3.4% to borrow from investors for 10 years, it pays only 2.5% for the OA – 0.9% lower – to borrow from CPF members for 30 to 40 years.

With a current OA balance of $178 bil, the govt would need to pay investors $6.05 bil in interest at 3.4%. CPF members are however paid only only $4.45 bil, ie resulting in annual ‘savings’ of $1.6 bil.

Point to note is our 10-year govt bond yield has been higher than CPF OA rate for 18 months. According to the Federal Reserve, interest rates are expected to stay high for “some time”. This would mean CPF members will continue to be shortchanged much longer. https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/feds-bowman-expects-it-be-appropriate-raise-rates-further-2023-10-02/

It is not known if GIC has been earning a guaranteed rate of return by taking in CPF funds at 2.5% to invest in other sovereign bonds offering much higher yields, eg Brazilian or Colombian bonds yielding about 11.5%; in which case GIC makes a guaranteed 9% return. There is a generous margin for currency depreciation, even if GIC invests in other sovereign bonds with lower yields.

World Government Bonds – Daily updated yields

The formula for computing CPF interest rates is obviously flawed and it allows GIC/government to profit off billions of dollars from CPF members annually. Shouldn’t MPs be speaking out?